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ABSTRACT
is report analyzes the Google search results from more than 1,500
volunteer data donors who, in the ve weeks leading up to the
federal election on September 24th, 2017, automatically searched
Google for 16 predened names of political parties and politicians
every four hours. It is based on an adjusted database consisting
of more than 8,000,000 data records, which were generated in the
context of the research project ”#Datenspende: Google und die Bun-
destagswahl 2017” and sent to us for evaluation. e #Datenspende
project was commissioned by six state media authorities. Spiegel
Online acted as a media partner. Focal points of the present study
are i. a. the question of the degree of personalization of search
results, the proportion of regionalization and the risk of algorithm-
based lter bubble formation or reinforcement by the leader in the
search engine market.
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1 INTRODUCTION: THE FILTER BUBBLE’S
DANGERS TO SOCIETY
Political formation of opinion as well as general access to informa-
tion has changed signicantly due to digitalization. Information
sources such as newspapers, TV and radio, where large parts of
the population read, heard, or saw the same news and interpreta-
tions of these news stories, are being replaced by more and more
diverse and personalized media oerings as a result of digital trans-
formation. Personalization is enabled by algorithm-based systems:
here, an algorithm – not a human – decides which contents users
might be interested in, and only these are oered to them in social
networks. e same is true for personalized search engines like
Google, Yahoo or Bing, for which, at more than 3,200 billion search
queries in 2016 (Statista, 2016), it is impossible to have a man-made
sorting available.
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1.1 e model of algorithmically generated
and amplied lter bubbles
e possibilities and dangers of a so-called algorithmically gener-
ated lter bubble increase steadily. is term is to be understood
as a partial concept of the lter bubble theory by Eli Pariser. In his
2011 book, ”e Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from
You” (Pariser, 2011), the internet activist pointed out the possible
dangers of so-called lter bubbles. In his TED talk and on the basis
of two screenshots from 2011, he showed that two of his friends had
received signicantly dierent results when searching for ”Egypt”
on the online search platform Google1. From this he developed a
theory according to which personalized algorithms in social media
tend to present individuals with content that matches the user’s
previous views, leading to the emergence of dierent information
spheres where dierent contents or opinions prevail.
In short, ltering the information ow individually can result in
groups or individuals being oered dierent facts, thus living in
a unique informational universe2. is is especially worrying if
the respective content is politically extreme in nature and if a one-
sided perspective results in impairment or total deterioration of
citizens’ discursive capabilities. A lter bubble in this sense is
a selection of news that corresponds to one’s own perspectives,
which could potentially lead to solidication of one’s own position
in the political sphere3.
1.1.1 Filtering search results with personalization and regional-
ization. Since the number of web pages associated with a search
term is more than 10 for most queries and at the same time the
rst 10 web pages shown receive the greatest aention from users,
it is essential that search engines lter the possible search results.
Certainly one of the most important lters is the user’s language,
while topicality and popularity play an additional role as well as,
to a lesser extent, embedment in the entire WWW (e.g. measured
1See Eli Pariser’s TED talk ”Beware the lter bubbles”,
hps://www.ted.com/talks/eli pariser beware online lter bubbles (accessed
May 12th 2018)
2”a unique universe of information for each of us” (Pariser, 2011, p. 9).
3”Filter bubbles” can be understood as even more advanced concepts. Selecting websites
by means of state cencorship can also create lter bubbles by restricting information.
While this cencorship is supported by algorithms, this does not constitute a lter bubble
through algorithm-based personalization that is hypothesized in this text. is kind of
restriction of information and its possible consequences for lter bubble formation
aren’t examined here. Aer all, a search engine operator or a social media platform
could knowingly and intentionally limit the data base in a certain direction, thus
presenting all users with the same content while only oering a selective extract of
reality. is option is not examined here.
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by the PageRank).
A particularly important ltering mechanism within the framework
of Eli Pariser’s lter bubble theory is ”personalization”. Regarding
the term of (preselected) personalization, we follow the state-
ments given by Zuidserveen Borgesius et al. (2016), according to
which personalization allows the selection of content that has not
yet been clicked by the user, but which is associated with users
with similar interests. Algorithmically speaking, this is based on
so-called ”recommendation systems”, which determine the inter-
ests of a currently searching user from other people who have
shown similar click behavior in the past. It is also also plausible
that according to their own click behavior and together with known
categorizations of clicked content a prole is compiled for each
person, saying, for instance: ”is person prefers news about sports
and business, reads medium-length text and news that are not older
than a day.” (Weare, 2009). Considering the vast number of users,
both methods can only be achieved algorithmically, using dierent
modes of machine learning and thus only form statistical models
(Zweig et al., 2017). Generally it can be expected that users logged
into their Google accounts will tend to receive more personalized
search results.
Websites from the search result list which have previously been
clicked by a user are delimited from personalization. For outsiders,
those might not be dierentiable from the entries that have been
personalized by algorithms, but regarding content they don’t con-
tribute to algorithm-based lter bubble formation or amplication,
since users have chosen those contents before.
We use the term regionalization for a sample of websites for a
whole group of persons who currently search from a specic re-
gion or are known to originate from a specic region, yet don’t
necessarily mention a region in their search request. For instance,
the current location can roughly be derived from the searching
device’s IP address, or more accurately from smartphone location
information or from the prole known to the search engine (Teevan
et al., 2011). e delivered websites themselves clearly relate to
the location of interest specied by Google; which can be the case,
for example, if a nearby location’s name appears on the website
repeatedly.
It is important to note that regionalization on a particularly small
scale can be counted towards personalization – for example, if
a selection of regional websites is delivered to each person of a
household while diering from the selection for their neighbors.
1.1.2 When are algorithmically generated and amplified filter
bubbles dangerous? Eli Pariser’s lter bubble theory, with its unset-
tling consequences for society, is based on these four basic mecha-
nisms:
(1) Personalization: An individually customized selection of
contents, which achieves a new level of granularity and
previously unknown scalability.
(2) Low overlap of respective news results: A low or non-
existent overlap of lter bubbles, i. e. news and information
from one group remain unknown to another.
(3) Contents: e nature of the content, which essentially
only becomes problematic with politically charged topics
and drastically dierent perspectives.
(4) Isolation fromother sources of information: e groups
of people whose respective news situation displays homo-
geneous, politically charged and one-sided perspectives,
rarely use other sources of information or only those which
place them in extremely similar lter bubbles.
e stronger those four mechanisms manifest themselves, the
stronger the lter bubble eect grows, including its harmful conse-
quences for society. e degree of personalization is essential, as
politically relevant lter bubbles do not emerge if personalization
of an algorithm responsible for selecting news is low. Higher or
high personalization and veriable lter bubbles do not necessarily
take political eect if either their contents aren’t political in nature
or users make use of other sources of information as well. For
instance, information delivered to citizens of dierent languages
are free of overlap by denition, if the results are displayed in those
languages – regardless, content-wise those citizens aren’t in any
way embedded in lter bubbles.
1.2 Examining Eli Pariser’s lter bubble theory
As algorithms are capable of controlling the ow of information
directed towards users, they are assigned a gatekeeper role simi-
lar to journalists in traditional journalism (see Moe & Syvertsen,
2007). As a result, it is necessary to examine how powerful the
algorithmically generated and hardened lter bubbles on various
intermediaries and search engines actually are. e number of
reliable studies is relatively low: an important German study by the
Hans Bredow institute oers a positive answer to the question of
the informational mix: sources of information today are diverse and
capable of pervading other news and information of algorithmically
generated and hardened lter bubbles (Schmidt et al., 2017). It is
pointed out that algorithms oer a possibility to burst open lter
bubbles if such a functionality is explicitly implemented.
To our knowledge, apart from anecdotal examinations, a quanti-
tative evaluation of the degree of personalization for a larger user
base hasn’t been deducted up until 2017: for example, in the context
of a Slate article Jacob Weisberg asked ve persons to search for
topics and found results to be very similar (Weisberg, 2011).
Vital questions of the degree of personalization and overlap of
single news ows can only be resolved with a large user base. Ex-
ecuting such an investigation appears imperative, especially in
light of the debate regarding inuence of lter bubbles in social
networks, which was sparked in 2016 aer Donald Trump’s presi-
dential election victory – unfortunately, due to insucient APIs4,
this is currently not possible. Given the major political event of the
federal elections we decided to realize the #Datenspende: project
in order to nd out whether Google already personalizes search
results, as has oen been speculated. Additionally, it is much sim-
pler to carry out such an examination on search engines, whose
results are presented on an HTML page that can easily be processed
further. With this project we have introduced a study design that
is capable of answering this question automatically for any sample
of search engine users and for any search request. Owing to its
design, users were able to comprehend at all times which search
requests we presented to Google by using their account. As a result,
4An API is an interface which enables automated interaction with a program. For
example, information can directly be requested from data bases by use of an API.
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the data collection was trustworthy and the required soware was
downloaded more than 4000 times.
Furthermore, the study design represents a proof of concept, as
it enables society to permanently monitor search engines’ degree
of personalization for any desired search terms. e general de-
sign can also be transferred to intermediaries, if appropriate APIs
restrict selective access to content relevant to the study in order
to establish a similar degree of trustworthiness. For example, on
Facebook this would mean selective access to media messages or
political advertisements in a respective time-line, while excluding
access to private messages from friends.
2 STUDY DESIGN
e study design as well as the fundamentals of the survey are
explained below. is includes the data structure, relevant termi-
nology and processing of the data basis.
2.1 Soware structure and enrollment
Figure 1: Browser plug-in, immediately before initiating a
search for a user whose rst result page then was transfered
(and thus ”donated”) to the provided server structure.
e basic tool used for data collection is a plug-in that is easily
integrated into the web browser and then utilizes the donating
user’s browser to automatically run search requests and send the
data to a central server. e plug-in was created in cooperation
with the company lokaler’ and was available for the web browsers
Chrome and Firefox in order to achieve a market coverage of more
than 60% in Germany (Statista, 2018). All necessary insights into
the plug-in source code were released at the start of the project5.
At xed points in time (4:00, 8:00, 12:00, 16:00, 20:00 and 0:00), the
plug-in searched for 16 search terms, given that the browser was
open at that time6. e search requests to Google and Google News
proceeded automatically and the donors’ personal results were au-
tomatically sent to our data donation servers. Consequently, for
5hps://github.com/algorithmwatch/datenspende, published June 7th 2017.
6If the browser was turned o at one or multiple times of search, a cycle of search
requests would be started when turning it on again the next time – which is why
there are search result lists with dierent time stamps. Additionally, it was possible to
manually start a search cycle in one’s own browser.
each user and point in time 16 search terms were requested twice
and the respective rst page of the search results was saved.
e search terms are limited to the seven major political parties and
their respective leaders (see Table 1). As can be seen in Figure 1, af-
ter downloading the plug-in users were free to decide whether they
wanted to be informed about future donations or if those should
predominantly run in the background.
Information regarding the project and the related call for the data
donation were distributed via our project partners’ communication
channels as well as our media partner Spiegel Online (Horchert,
2017). As a result, 4,384 plug-in installations took place. e result-
ing search results are freely accessible to the public for analytical
purposes7.
It should be pointed out that all results that can be seen in the
nal report are not necessarily representative, as the data donors
were recruited voluntarily and by self-selection. For the most vital
ndings however, especially regarding the degree of personaliza-
tion, we assume that they do not change much if the user base is
representative.
Table 1: e plug-in’s search terms for xed search times.
It should also be noted that an automated search for about an
approximate dozen of search terms can have an inuence on the
search engine algorithm itself. On Google Trends, over the runtime
of our data collection and for the search terms ”Dietmar Bartsch”,
”Katrin Gu¨ring-Eckardt” and ”Bu¨ndnis90/Die Gru¨nen” it can clearly
be seen that the search request volume was hereby increased (see
Figure 2).
Since the search requests were performed automatically and none
of the oered links were actively clicked, we suspect the eects to
be rather low. However, lacking exact knowledge of the underlying
algorithm, this can’t be proven and has to remain unevaluated.
2.2 Data structure and relevant terms
For further analysis, the available data was structured as follows.
On the one hand we dierentiated between search results directly
on Google (www.google.de) or on the search engine provider’s
7hps://datenspende.algorithmwatch.org/data.html
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Figure 2: Chronological sequence of the search terms ”Ka-
trin Go¨ring-Eckardt” and ”Dietmar Bartsch” (above) and the
search term ”Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen” (below). e Google
Trends diagrams clearly show the increase in search occur-
rences for the search terms due to the plug-in, which was
unlocked on July 7th 2017.
news page (news.google.com). e entire database was divided
into these two categories. While usually 20 results according to the
search terms were displayed on the news portal, 10 results as well
as three additional so called top stories are displayed to the user
using the default search feature (see Figure 3).
While Google searches primarily refer to personal websites, social
media accounts and aggregate subject/topic pages for the parties
and persons (cf. Section 3.4), the Google news search only shows
news from previously registered partners8. As a result, the lifespan
of news results is limited, i.e. that most news are displayed to users
over a low number of search points in time, while the personal
websites and social media accounts of parties and politicians are
almost always shown. us, a separate inspection of news search
and Google search results seems reasonable.
For regular Google search results we drew a distinction between
the (not always received) top stories and ”organic” search results,
i.e. the 8-10 results in the lower le segment of the results page
(Figure 3 shows two organic search results for the search term
”Angela Merkel”). At times, Google’s search result pages contain
information in the right segment as well, e.g. advertisements or info
8See Google’s help center, e.g. hps://support.google.com/news/publisher-
center/answer/6016113?hl=en&ref topic=9010378
boxes regarding individuals or parties. ose were not transferred
to our servers, but rather potential top stories and the actual search
result page.
Apart from the search type (”Google”, ”Google news search”) the
following information was saved:
• An approximate location based on the user’s transmied
IP address.
• e user login status in their Google account. A user can
be ”logged in” or ”not logged in”.
• e browser language (not the search language that is
entered in the Google account).
• e search term and time stamp of the search.
• An ID generated by the plug-in that does not give any
hints regarding the user, but remains unchanged for all
data donations, as long as the plug-in is not re-installed.
• If available, a descriptive link text is saved as well (usually
only available for organic search results, but not always).
• If it is a top story, the corresponding date (e.g. ”54 minutes
ago”, ”3 hours ago”) is saved as well.
• e search results’ URL.
• Most of the time, for top stories and Google news results
the medium (news source) and the news title are stated
and saved (e.g. ”Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten” with ”is
is what our readers have to say regarding Cem O¨zdemir’s
appearance”).
Additionally, the following terms are used in this report:
Investigation period: is term is used for the time pe-
riod between August 21st 2017 and September 24th 2017.
Here, only weekdays and the election weekend specically
are taken into account (for further information, see Section
3.1). erefore, the investigation period spans 27 days.
Search time: We dene the search time as a day and cor-
responding time of day within the investigation period,
which can be 12:00, 16:00 or 20:00. We perform this limita-
tion because the number of searching users is signicantly
lower for other times of search. e sum of times of search
thus amounts to 81 (three separate times for each of 27
days in total).
(Search) result list: We understand a result list as the sum
of URLs which are delivered to a user for a given search
term and search time.
Top stories and organic search results: e top stories
term is used for up to three news items which Google oc-
casionally displays at the top of a regular Google search
request (see Section 6.1). Apart from purely textual infor-
mation, a corresponding image is shown (see Figure 3). e
remaining search results will hereinaer be referred to as
organic search results.
Top-level domain: Each URL references a main domain
(top-level domain) and directories potentially located there.
e main domain corresponds with the portion between
the URL protocol specication (hp://, hps://) and the rst
following slash (”/”). e top-level domain of hp://www.faz.net/
aktuell/wirtscha/gruenen-chef-cem-oezdemir-will-
gelaendewagen-bestrafen-wer-suv-faehrt-soll-die-kosten-
fuer-die-umwelt-tragen-15201893.html consequently is www.faz.net.
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Figure 3: Google search for Angela Merkel with three deliv-
ered top stories.
As is the case with most data collections, corrupt or divergent
entries occur. e plug-in, too, did not run smoothly from the onset
and produced partially corrupt data. erefore, we describe the
necessary data preparation below.
2.3 Data preparation
e Firefox version’s rst plug-in assigned the same ID to all users.
As we intended to analyze the changes to search result lists over
time, we decided to generally disregard that data in order to achieve
a consistent database. As a result, 34% of all donated URLs for the
Google search and 41% for Google News searches are omied.
A rst analysis of the available data (see Section 3) shows further
irregularities. Noticeably, the database contained search result lists
which in length didn’t conform to expected standards (ten entries
for the common Google search and 20 entries for searches on the
news portal). For instance, the database contained some datasets
with 200 entries in the search result lists. is can be traced to the
possibility of individually adjusting the number of search results
displayed on the rst page. We have shortened these lists to the
standard 10 plus potentially displayed top stories. Other errors are
based on imperfect coding of the rst Firefox plug-in, resulting in
search result lists which contained the same URL throughout the
list. ose lists were not included in our analysis.
e same applies to URLs which only contained a reference to the
corresponding URL at Google (google.de/url) or displayed a URL
entry which merely referred to ”google” and didn’t contain a full
link – those entries point to a private search result. Moreover, it was
noticeable that a series of search result lists contained signicant
numbers of URLs that referred to websites in other languages.
To dispose of foreign results, we manually sorted top-level domains
of all websites by language. is way, we determined the share
of German websites and kept those whose share was above 50%.
As a consequence, our subsequently used database was limited to
German result lists. With these adjusted measures, the datasets in
our investigation period for the Google search were reduced by
19,6%9 and by 16,7%10 for Google news data. A short list of the
adjusted datasets can be found in Table 2.
Table 2: Tabular overview of donated data aer data prepa-
ration.
3 DATA OVERVIEW
In this section we give a rst overview of the data.
3.1 Chronological distribution of search
requests
When looking at the daily distribution of our data donations, a clear
decrease in donated search result lists during weekends showed.
In Figure 4 the number of received URLs per day and search term
are displayed and a wave-like paern can be seen, while the lowest
points are located at the weekends. Consequently, signicantly
fewer users had their browsers open on weekends and donated
data, which can be aributed to a lower computer usage on week-
ends.
e daily number of data donors were mostly kept stable for
both Google Search (see Figure 5) and Google News (see Figure 6)
by limiting our observations to weekdays over the investigation
period. us, between 450 and 550 users were online and donated
their search results on the respective days. Also, the ratio between
logged in and not logged in users remained similar over the in-
vestigation period. e weekend from September 23rd/24th was
only added due to its proximity to the election and appears slightly
out of the ordinary due to its 350 users. Statistically speaking, the
numbers of cases are still suciently high to obverse those days as
well.
9From 4.416.585 to 3.564.583
10From 6.712.733 to 5.597.480
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Figure 4: Number of submitted URLs for Google Search dur-
ing the last 5 weeks before the 2017 federal election.
Figure 5: Number of users on the respective days of the in-
vestigation period for Google Search, aer data cleansing.
3.2 Geographic distribution of data donors
e distribution of users on the map of Germany in Figure 7 shows
that we managed to acquire data donors Germany-wide and that
Figure 6: Number of users on the respective days of the in-
vestigation period for Google News, aer data cleansing.
our data preparation (see Section 2.3) does not suggest regional
eects: Locations that are not included aer our data preparation
are displayed as reds dots. ose are spread all over Germany;
overall, the West of Germany is represented more strongly.
3.3 Distribution of internet and media
oerings in the search results
For the remaining data set we rst calculated which top-level do-
mains managed to get onto the rst search result page most oen
for every search term. Figure 8 shows the results for the politi-
cal parties and Figure 9 those for the politicians. For all parties
except for Die Linke the respective party’s own top-level domain
ranks rst, for Die Linke it ranks 4th, while the parliamentary
group’s website ranks second. Likewise, the respective Facebook
account is always the second to fourth most common link, Twier
manages an entry into the top 10 for four parties; for all parties
except for the AfD, this is accompanied by the German Wikipedia
entry. For the AfD there is a German Wikipedia entry as well, but
it does not appear as oen as the aggregate topic pages of Focus,
Zeit, Merkur, Spiegel, FAZ and Tagesspiegel. A regular appear-
ance for parties except for Die Gru¨nen is the top-level domain
www.bundestagswahl-bw.de, which oers an overview of all par-
ties. ”bundestageswahl-2017.com”, which appears for Die Gru¨nen
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Figure 7: Distribution of data donors in Germany, where the
respective positions were determined on the basis of the IP
address and are therefore only an approximation of the po-
sition of the individual users. e red dots are coordinates
that are no longer included in the database aer data cleans-
ing.
and the SPD, is a private collection of information relating to the
parties and their platforms. It stands out that both Bu¨ndnis 90/Die
Gru¨nen and Die Linke predominantly have their own websites in
the top 10 results, or those that could be altered by them with some
degree of eort, e.g. in case of false coverage. is includes Face-
book and Twier as well as Wikipedia in general.
For politicians, the personal website is always in the top 10 as well,
for Alexander Gauland and Alice Weidel those are subpages of the
top-level domain www.afd.de and thus not specically visible. e
corresponding German Wikipedia entry appears for all of them as
well, besides a changing number of social media accounts, which
are completely absent for Alexander Gauland. As a maer of fact,
we could not nd any personal social media account of Alexander
Gauland, his website refers to the respective accounts of the AfD.
Most big German online news magazines have topic pages, which
collect news relating to a person or institution and oen display
an introductory, general text about the topic. Such person-related
topic pages can be found for politicians among the top 10 of the
top-level domains, but news from those and other sources as well.
Figure 8: Most common top-level domains for the organic
Google search for the parties.
Examining the top-level domains for the top stories, a less uni-
form picture emerges (see Figure 10): While AfD, CDU, CSU, SPD
and FDP receive most top stories from far-reaching media compa-
nies, the top 10 sources for Die Gru¨nen and Die Linke are lesser-
known in some instances. For the searched persons, there are other
sources to be found besides the most far-reaching, like the Gen-
eralanzeiger Bonn (for Cem O¨zdemir) or www.epochtimes.de (for
Alexander Gauland and Katrin Gu¨ring-Eckhardt) (see Figure 11).
For the sake of completeness, Figure 12 and 13 also show the top 10
of top-level domains for the respective searches on Google News.
A media studies classication of the respective sources can not be
provided here – the data however is available for future analysis11.
Overall, the rst result page both for Google News and Google’s
organic search are dominated by renowned media companies, es-
pecially from the printing sector. Exceptions to this are the on-
line newspaper Hungton Post and Freemail service provider t-
online.de, which oen appear as news sources. When searching
for the terms ”Christian Lindner” and ”FDP”, Google provides a
website as a news result which is being managed by the party’s
federal branch.
3.4 Owned Content, Social Media and media
oerings
e search result lists contain dierent result categories, as Figure
14 shows for an example of a search for ”Cem O¨zdemir”. An inter-
esting question when assessing the diversity of results delivered by
11hps://datenspende.algorithmwatch.org/data.html
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Figure 9: Most common top-level domains for the organic
Google search for the persons.
Figure 10: Most common top-level domains for the top sto-
ries of the Google search for the parties.
search engines is to look at their distribution on dierent oering
categories and especially in asking the question of the extent to
which persons or parties are able to edit their contents. Websites
of candidates and parties evidently belong to the laer. To that
Figure 11: Most common top-level domains for the Google
News person searches.
Figure 12: Most common top-level domains for the top sto-
ries of the Google search for the persons.
end, each individual URL was manually assigned to the database
and one of 7 dierent categories, according to its top-level domain;
URLs of the Media category were categorized in a more nuanced
way12. A detailed description of those individual categories can be
found in Appendix A.
12We thank the Bavarian Regulatory Authority for Commercial Broadcasting (Bay-
erische Landeszentrale fu¨r Neue Medien, BLM) for this dicult work.
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Figure 13: Most common top-level domains for the Google
News party searches.
Figure 14: Division of organic search results for the search
term ”Cem O¨zdemir” into three possible categories: per-
sonal websites, which can be further divided into ”Owned
Content” and ”Social Media”, editable websites such as
Wikipedia and news. Besides, aggregate news services such
as Freemail portals appear frequently (t-online, web.de), but
were not among the results of this search.
It is more than astonishing that of the 4754 top-level domains
of the Google search that were delivered during the investigation
period a predominant portion of 83% are subject to editability by
parties or persons (”Owned Content”). e vast majority of Owned
Content consists of pages of local branches belonging to the re-
spective parties (see Table 4). Some parties are signicantly more
active than others: While the sum of search results for the AfD
provides a mere 6 clearly discernible individual top-level domains,
it is more than 1000 for the SPD and nearly 950 for the CDU. Besides
Table 3: Distribution of all top-level domains of the Google
search over the oering categories.
websites of parties and persons and the approximately 400 media
domains, the relatively high number of publicly funded domains
stands out (about 300 domains). ose primarily represent cities
and municipalities; however, the website of the Federal Agency for
Civic Education and the Bundestag are included here as well.
Table 4: Number of top-level domainswhich can be assigned
to a party. ey usually represent a local branch, the party
itself or individual party members.
Figure 15 shows the distribution of organic search results (with-
out top stories) over the entire investigation period. Here, distinct
dierences can be found regarding the share of URLs in the cate-
gories Owned Content and Media between individuals and parties.
e amount of links referencing a Wikipedia page lies above 10%,
which means slightly above one link, as there are users who re-
ceived both the German and English Wikipedia entry. Due to this
categorization it is now possible to dierentiate between the entire
proportion editable by a party or individual and the proportion
that can not be edited (media, Freemail portals, publicly funded and
others).
Summarizing the proportion of the respective categories for the
particular parties (see Table 5), further evidence of a varying media
presence in the digital space presents itself. While Bu¨ndnis 90/Die
Gru¨nen with 60% and Die Linke as well as the FDP with about 50%
have achieved a very high proportion of Owned Content (i. e. links
to own domains of parties, local branches or politicians), the CDU
and SPD manage a mere 30%. A chicken-and-egg problem arises: A
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Figure 15: Distribution of organic search results among dierent categories in %, le for individuals, right for parties. e
9-10 organic search results a user receives when searching for a person thus contained e. g. on average two URLs from the
category ”Social Media” and 4-5 links from the category ”media”.
well-working search engine optimization (SEO) provides good visi-
bility of contents for all search engines, but good visibility in search
engines can also lead to high popularity of contents in all search
engines, which in turn results in good visibility in search engines.
erefore, the reason for some parties’ own content being more vis-
ible to themselves does not seem assessable. Aer all the conducted
investigations we consider it most likely that those parties are most
visible that provide a sucient amount of timely content both on
the regionalization as well as the news level. Table 5 shows the
same analysis for search results that represent individuals. Here it
is noticeable that especially for Gauland, who does not own social
media accounts, less directly or in principle editable domains are
delivered in total – for most other persons approximately two social
media accounts are delivered. Frequently a publicly funded domain
is shown for those with a seat in the German Parliament (e. g.
www.bundestag.de, www.bundeskanzlerin.de), which are missing
for Gauland, Weidel, Schulz and Lindner.
Finally Figure 16 shows the distribution of categories for the
delivered top stories in the Google search. No signicant dierences
both on the search term level as well as aggregated by parties or
persons could be observed. e majority of 85% always comes from
the print media sector with an online presence. Media oerings
with the internet as their sole path of distribution are displayed
in the top stories with 9%, while only 3% represent public service
channels and online branches of classic German private television
service providers.
4 SCOPE FOR PERSONALIZATION/
REGIONALIZATION
e #Datenspende project is a proof-of-concept to demonstrate
that black-box analysis enables society to investigate algorithmic
decision-making systems such as search engines – but in principle
others such as product recommendation systems or social media
as well – for dangerous spots. A much-debated dangerous spot
Figure 16: Share of media delivered by Google in the top sto-
ries during the investigation period for Google search of all
search terms.
in recent years has been the algorithm-based formation and re-
inforcement of lter bubbles based on personalized search and
recommendation lters. e question of whether and to what ex-
tent search engine users receive dierent news and information
about important political institutions and persons was therefore
the focus of the analysis. e fact that we inspected a search engine
and not the much more vulnerable social media such as Facebook
was above all a maer of easier access to the results.
Personalization of search results, as stated previously, is understood
to describe a customized preparation or selection of search results
that the user has not yet clicked. Suggestions are made based on
proles and click behavior of other users perceived as being similar.
What did you see?
Personalization, regionalization and the question of the filter bubble in Google’s search engineCo ference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
Table 5: Distribution of the organic search results on the dierent categories, for the searches for the parties. e circular
diagrams represent the proportion of all websites that are (in principle) editable by the person or party in red (Owned Content,
Social Media and Wikipedia) and the proportion of websites on which such an intervention is not possible (Freemail portals,
media, publicly funded and others), in blue.
Table 6: Distribution of the organic search results on the
dierent categories, for the searches for the parties. e
circular diagrams represent the proportion of all websites
that are (in principle) editable by the person or party in red
(Owned Content, social media and Wikipedia) and the pro-
portion ofwebsites onwhich such an intervention is not pos-
sible (Freemail portals , media, publicly funded and others),
in blue.
e personalization itself can be conveyed in the chosen selection,
but also in a dierent order in the presentation of the found results.
In the explanations for the use of the Google service it says:
”We use automated systems that analyze your
content to provide you with things like cus-
tomized search results, personalized ads, or
other features tailored to how you use our ser-
vices. And we analyze your content to help us
detect abuse such as spam, malware and illegal
content.”13
So how signicant was this personalization for the data donors
before the 2017 federal election?
4.1 Proportion of similar search results
e book by Eli Pariser noted the many potential dangers of lter
bubbles and expressed the concern that every person is trapped
inside their own lter bubble (”being isolated in a web of one” 14),
which likely contains ”information desserts” rather than nutritious
information 15(”information vegetables”). erefore, a rst inter-
esting question is which share of data donor pairs will be shown
exactly the same links and in addition, what percentage of them
will get these links in exactly the same order.
For the results of the Google search (without top stories), the results
summarized in Table 7 show the percentage of identical result lists
and identical result lists in the same order. In fact, these percentages
are essentially in the low single-digit percentage range – apart from
the AfD, where 16% of data donor pairs contain the same results. It
is important to emphasize that this does not mean that 16% of the
result lists are exactly identical. An example: if out of 100 people
two groups of people with 5 and 6 members each get exactly the
same results and everyone else does not share the exact same links
with anyone, then there are 10 pairs of users and 15 pairs of users,
each seeing the same links, from a total of 4,950 pairs. is corre-
sponds to 0.51% of all pairs and thus almost to the result for the CDU.
Truly remarkable is the enormously high share of pairs with sim-
ilar search results for the persons, which is – except for Alexander
Gauland – on average at least a quarter and for some almost 50%.
13hps://policies.google.com/privacy?gl=de#infouse, (2018, August 12)
14From Eli Pariser’s TED Talk: hps://www.ted.com/talks/eli pariser beware online lter bubbles,
minute 8.
15From Eli Pariser’s TED Talk: hps://www.ted.com/talks/eli pariser beware online lter bubbles,
minute 5-6.
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Krat, Gamer and Zweig
Table 7: Share (in percent) of identical search resultswithout
consideration of sorting, separated by keywords for parties
and persons (2nd column). In column 3, the proportion (in
percent) of identical search results can be found in the exact
same order.
In other words, had we asked any two data donors to do a search
for one of the persons at the same time, the same links would have
been delivered to a quarter to almost half of those pairs – and for
about 5-10% in the same order as well. If there were lter bubbles
here, at least some of them would be quite spacious and would
aect larger groups of people at the same time.
A manual inspection of the result lists of Alexander Gauland sug-
gests that notably the missing social media accounts lead to this
result: ese are replaced by messages which apparently are de-
livered in a more diverse way. Reviewing Figure 9 supports this
hypothesis. e illustration shows that politicians have dierent
numbers of Owned Content and Editable domains among their top
10 top-level domains. Table 8 compares the percentage of similar
search result lists to the number of Owned Content and Social
Media top-level domains in the top 10 of search result top-level
domains. It becomes apparent that more of these top-level domains
among the top 10 correlate with a higher conformity of search
result lists.
Table 8: Comparison of the type of top-level domains of
politicians among their top 10 top-level domains (Figure 9)
and the percentage of identical result lists.
In any case, it should be noted that even for people receiving the
same links, the order is likely to be dierent since the proportion
of those with exactly the same order of those with the same results
is in most cases below 50%.
4.2 Average number of common links
Just because two people do not get exactly the same links does
not mean that they get completely dierent links. erefore, Table
9 and Table 10 each show the average number of common links
for all pairs of data donors that look up the same search term at
the same search time. For persons, the number ranges between
7.2 and 8.1 common links. is also has to be correlated to the
average length of the search result lists. Since this is just over 9, on
average only 1 to almost 2 links per randomly drawn pair of data
donors are dierent. is is the ”scope for personalization”, which
means the number of search results that could now be lled with
links of various political content. In any case, the informational
situation regarding the persons is – on average! – essentially the
same. erefore, on average we observe a very high overlap of the
received news and information.
Table 9: e mean result list length without top stories (3rd
column) for the persons compared to the average number of
URLs, which share a result list with all other result lists at
the same search time (2nd column). From this, the average
scope for personalization can be calculated by subtraction
(4th column).
For the parties, the result looks a bit dierent. Here, any two data
donors searching for ”Die Linke” at the same time have only 4.7
common links on average, for the ”AfD” up to 7 links. Comparing
this with the average lengths of the search result lists again, which
uctuate16 between 8 and 9, for the parties an average of 2 (AfD), 3
(Bu¨ndnis90/Die Gru¨nen, Die Linke, FDP) and almost 4 (CDU, CSU)
of non-shared links remain.
Figure 17 and Figure 18 show that the averages essentially origi-
nate from distributions that are skewed to the le. is is because
each pair can share a maximum of 8 or 9 links, depending on the
average length of the lists. erefore, to the right this limit is closer
than to the le. Only the AfD shows a bimodal distribution, e. g.
10% of pairs of data donors sharing only 2 links. is nding will
be further considered below (Section 5).
16e short organic search result lists are an eect of displayed top stories (the or-
ganic search result list usually contains 9 entries then) and can be further reduced by
displaying deletion hints or the like. Especially with ”Die Linke”, such eects seem to
have shortened the search result lists. Since the corresponding information was not
saved on the search results page, we can not make a nal assessment here.
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Table 10: emean result list length without top stories (3rd
column) for the parties compared to the average number of
URLs that share a result list with all other result lists at the
same search time (2nd column). From this, the average scope
for personalization can be calculated by subtraction (4th col-
umn).
Figure 17: Distribution of the number of identical URLs in
pairwise comparison of the organic search results for the
parties.
Figure 18: Distribution of the number of identical URLs in
pairwise comparison of the organic search results for the
persons.
We also conducted the same investigation on the Google News
search result lists, the outcome of which we will discuss in the next
section.
4.3 Scope for personalization on Google News
e search result lists on Google News almost always contain 20
entries, therefore the average rounded lengths are 20 for almost all
of the search terms. Of these, for persons on average 17.3 to 18.3 are
shared. e percentage of shared links is thus even higher than for
the Google Search, leaving 2 to 3 links with possibly personalized
messages.
Figure 19: e mean result list length on Google News (3rd
column) for the persons compared to the average number
of URLs that share a result list with all other result lists at
the same search time (2nd column). From this, the average
scope for personalization can be calculated by subtraction
(4th column).
For the parties, the scope for personalized messages (on av-
erage) is also rather small and ranges from 1.3 to 2.1 for all but
”Bu¨ndnis90/Die Gru¨nen”, where up to 3 links from 18 could be
personalized. It is important to note that only pairs of people are
considered here. at which A and B do not share, B could share
with C. us, these non-shared links do not necessarily have to
be displayed to only one person, but may again aect smaller sub-
groups.
Figure 20: e mean result list length on Google News (3rd
column) for the parties compared to the average number of
URLs that share a result list with all other result lists at the
same search time (2nd column). From this, the average space
for personalization can be calculated by subtraction (4th col-
umn).
5 REGIONALIZATION
Due to the large amount of Owned Content, which can mainly be
aributed to the many websites of regional branches or the web-
sites of local politicians, regionalization of search results inevitably
leads to many non-shared links. erefore, we have once again
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categorized each party’s Owned Content as regional/non-regional.
We were rather conservative in our approach and have only marked
those domains as regional which clearly referenced a city in the
URL. For each pair of party search result lists, we rst removed
those regional URLs and then calculated the average number of
non-shared links. erefore, this represents a closer approximation
to the possible number of personalized links, because the regional
links are explicitly excluded. Table 11 shows the result of this re-
nement: While the data donors dier on average by 3 links for
Die Gru¨nen, only one of these is non-regional (and could be person-
alized). is is similar for the SPD, FDP, CDU, and Die Linke, each
falling from (about) 3 non-shared links to below 2 non-regional
links.
Table 11: Rening the average number of non-shared links
while taking into account regionalization. e le-hand
column shows the average number of non-shared links for
the entire search result list, and the right-hand one for the
search result list aer deleting the clearly regionalized web-
sites (the respective local branches or individual local politi-
cians).
ere is essentially no eect for the AfD to be seen – yet that
is not surprising, as only six top-level domains are displayed at all
and no websites belonging to local branches were found. Of the six
domains, four are of a regional nature (afd.berlin, afd.nrw, afd-bw.de,
afd-fraktion-brandenburg.de). Interestingly, lile change occurs for
the CSU, too. However, a look at the map of Germany showing the
approximate locations of our data donors shows that Bavaria has
fewer data donors who were still in the summer holidays during
the rst four weeks of the investigation period. Since most of the
local branches are located in Bavaria, hardly any regionalized search
results were delivered. A manual inspection of the search result lists
shows that relatively many messages are delivered that overlap less
strongly. Here, a more in-depth, content-related inspection appears
sensible. Nonetheless, on average the search result lists clearly
overlap more than half, so that here, too, a common information
base is laid out.
6 DYNAMICS
An important subquestion of the project concerns the dynamic in
which search results in the ordinary Google search change. One pos-
sible hypothesis here is that towards election day, Google’s search
results change in their similarity or the share of dierent media.
In the sequence of the previous analysis, we rst considered the
dynamics of the respective share of top stories as the most promi-
nently placed results (see Section 6.1). e second is an analysis
of the number of delivered top-level domains per search time (see
Section 6.2), followed by a look at the respective shares of editable
URLs in the search queries, i. e. Owned Content, Social Media and
(with some limitations) Wikipedia (see Section 6.3).
6.1 Dynamics of the occurrence of top stories
A rst interesting point in the question of whether the search re-
sults have changed towards the election was whether and when
top stories are displayed and whether the proportion of search re-
sults with top stories has increased towards the end of the election
campaign, for example. In this case, eects such as a higher news
density could lead, as an example, to Google delivering more search
result lists with top stories shortly before the election than ve
weeks before that.
However, the analysis of the occurrence of top stories has shown
that across all search terms and search times, the proportion hardly
uctuates. Percentages always range in a corridor around 90% with
up and down swings of no more than 10% (see Figure 21). Only
when looking at the individual search terms stronger deviations
have been found.
Figure 21: Proportion of all result lists for a search time,
where at least one top story was delivered.
ere are clear outliers for Katrin Gu¨ring-Eckardt and Dietmar
Bartsch (see Figure 22). In contrast, the shares of search result lists
with top stories for the search terms CSU, SPD, Angela Merkel,
Martin Schulz and AfD are very stable, although at the beginning
of the investigation period their proportion of top stories (search
time 6 to 22) is still subject to uctuations (see Figure 23). e
isolated, complete absence of top stories (see Figure 22) may indi-
cate that it is decided by Google whether or not to deliver a top
story according to the latest news – but these deviations can not
be fully explained from the outside. Without further information
it is particularly inexplicable why, for the same search time and
search request, Google delivers top stories for some participants
and does not do so for others. Especially the very stable values of
some search terms (CSU, SPD, Angela Merkel and Martin Schulz)
contradict a browser seing of these users which would suppress
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such a top story in any form, because then these users would not
have received top stories for other search terms (such as CSU, SPD,
Angela Merkel). However, these search terms show many search
times where all users received top stories.
Figure 22: Proportion of result lists with top stories for
the search terms ”Dietmar Bartsch” and ”Katrin Go¨ring-
Eckardt” show clear deviations from all others.
is inconsistency also becomes clear when looking at individual
users. For example, with the same user and search term sometimes
top stories appear and sometimes they do not (see Figure 24). Over-
all, however, the proportion of search result lists with top stories is
relatively stable and shows no particular temporal paerns with
regard to the federal election.
Figure 23: Proportion of all result lists that contain top sto-
ries, for the search terms CSU, SPD, Angela Merkel, Martin
Schulz and AfD.
Figure 24: Search results of a user fromAugust 28th 2017 for
the mentioned times and the search term ”Katrin Go¨ring-
Eckardt”. Top stories were once displayed to the same user
at dierent, consecutive search times (highlighted in gray)
and then they were not.
6.2 Dynamics of the number of dierent
top-level domains
In processing of the number of dierent top-level domains that were
delivered to at least one data donor at a search time, on the one
hand already recorded trends (see Figure 25, 26) conrm that search
result lists for parties generally have more top-level domains than
results lists for persons. On the other hand, this number uctuates
quite strongly from party to party: While only about 22 top-level
domains characterize the results on the AfD at most search times,
the number is around 180 for Die Gru¨nen (with large deviations).
Essentially, the number of top-level domains of the parties is re-
ected here again, and the uctuating extent of regionalization is
thus visible.
For the persons the number is between 17 and 18, which also shows
that the number of shared links (including top-level domains) is
very high for the persons.
Although the uctuations over the search period are sometimes
very pronounced, there are no striking temporal paerns in the
number of dierent top-level domains.
6.3 Dynamics of proportions of editable
contents
Over time, does the proportion of URLs that are on top-level do-
mains and that are editable by the parties or persons (in principle)
change over time? We also examined this question for all search
times during the investigation period. ere is a slight drop for all
parties (except Die Gru¨nen) for the search times right before the
election. It should be noted that the last 6 search times are from the
election weekend. Presumably this is caused by an increased share
of news, although this only takes eect in the last days before the
election.
For most persons, too, this short-term decline in editable websites
can be seen among the search results, which in some cases already
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Figure 25: Number of dierent top-level domains over the
81 search times for the Google search of parties.
starts one week before the election (Gauland, Lindner, O¨zdemir and
Wagenknecht). e result was not pursued further, because this
report deals with the key issues of personalization, regionalization
and lter bubbles. However, for media scientists it could prove to
be an interesting initial observation that can be followed up on by
means of the publicly available data from the data donation.
7 SEARCH RESULT LISTS WITH LOW
SIMILARITY TO ALL OTHERS
Even though most of the search result lists are very similar on av-
erage, some pairs of search result lists beyond the average showed
almost no overlap. As previously mentioned in the rst interim
report, a manual inspection of search result lists showed the occa-
sional result list that diers greatly from all of the others17. It was
determined that these lists oen contained links to websites in other
languages (mostly English). It is dicult to conclusively cluster
and identify these links automatically, partly because the link itself
does not necessarily give any insight on the language of the website
it links to, e. g. some websites end in ”.com” and still refer to a
German website like ”handelsbla.com”. Most social media pages
also end in ”.com” (twier.com, facebook.com) and the language
displayed depends on the user being logged in. On Wikipedia pages
the language is encoded into the rst two leers of the URL, so
”de.wikipedia.org” refers to the German, and ”en.wikipedia.org” to
17Section 4 of the rst interim report (Kra et al., 2017)
Figure 26: Number of dierent top-level domains over the
81 search times for the Google search of persons.
the English version of that page. Furthermore it is unclear if all
deviant clusters have to contain at least one website in a foreign
language.
We also followed a second approach, that also requires manual
preparation of the data: First links were removed that were seen
by least 70% of all users for each search term and time, since their
popularity suggests a lack of personalization. In the next step, we
clustered the lists with the remaining links, so that the lists within
these clusters are similar once more. e original lists of these
groups were then compared to every user outside of the group, to
nd the number of common links. For example: We nd 5 users,
who retained only 4 entries in their lists, aer the popular links
for the search term ”Die Linke” were removed, but still shared at
least 3 links with each other – they form a cluster. For these 5
users, we compared their original result lists with every other user
outside of the cluster to nd the average number of common links.
If this average falls below 3.5 the cluster is considered to be a very
distinct group. During a manual inspection of the identied dis-
tinct clusters we found that, especially for the search terms ”Die
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Figure 27: Proportion of (in principle) editable websites for
the respective party of all result links of the respective party.
Here, the proportion for each of the 81 search times is ap-
plied and the mean value is drawn in in gray.
Linke” and ”Bu¨ndnis90/Die Gru¨nen”, most of these clusters were
regional groupings, whose search result lists diered only in the
large selection of local branches of the party.
In summary we can say that automatically identifying groups of
users that receive dierent content according to the lter bubble
theory (not originating from regionalization), has proven to be
quite a complex task.
A third approach showed a clear paern that does indicate a stable
lter bubble, which would have to be subject to further studies:
Based on the time of publication that accompanies every top story,
it is possible to detect the main language Google assigns to a user.
Our data set contains publication times in Norwegian, English,
German and French. is made it possible to partition the search
result lists. In all examined cases, we saw a separation of users
by Google into ”presumably German” with high similarity of re-
sults per search term and time, and ”presumably foreigners” who
shared unusual results which were then mixed with results of the
suspected, preferred language.
is was done via manual inspection, since there was no possibil-
ity to automatically separate users into those that are considered
German-speaking by Google and those that are not (primarily)
German-speaking. Some users received German publication times
once and only English publication times aer that, and many of
the users manually agged as having partially non-German search
Figure 28: Proportion of (in principle) editable websites for
the respective persons of all result links for the respective
person. Here, the proportion for each of the 81 search times
is applied and the mean value is drawn in in gray.
result lists did not receive any top stories and therefore did not
receive publication times.
is paern will be demonstrated with some selected examples
below.
7.1 Example: Search result lists from a French
IP
Figure 29 shows the search results of a user in France. For the
result lists containing top stories one can clearly see that Google
suspects a French person, since the publication times that Google
adds to every news entry are French (e.g. ”Il y a 2 heurs”). e
top stories themselves link to French websites, which discuss the
German election. It is interesting to see that some lists contain
German results. e results for the search term ”Angela Merkel”
overall look like a sensible selection of websites – at least for a
person living in France.
For the search term ”AfD” the same person receives – along with re-
sults concerning the German political party – websites from French
initiatives with the same acronym, mainly L’Agence franc¸aise de
de´veloppement, a French organization ghting diabetes and sup-
porting people with autism and their families. Following the same
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Figure 29: Search results for the search term ”Angela
Merkel” of a user with an IP address in France, close to Paris.
e results are divided into three top stories and the organic
search results below.
method of looking for international institutions or organizations
with the same acronym as the political parties we found the French
Cultures et Socie´te´s Urbaines and the American universities Charles
Sturt University and Colorado State University while searching for
”CSU”.
e Google search for the German politicians is for the most part
without error, meaning that the user almost always receives infor-
mation about the persons searched for: e results contain mostly
the social media proles and – depending on the prominence of the
politician – their French Wikipedia entry and French news outlets;
this is especially the case with Angela Merkel and Martin Schulz.
Apart from that, the user receives German news websites and social
media pages. An exception to this is Cem O¨zdemir: One Twier
prole received belongs to another person with the same name18
and results concerning a football player on the transfer market19,
both of which are not members of ”Die Gru¨nen”.
e occurrence of links in the (suspected) native language of users
outside of Germany is without question useful and the amount of
German-speaking websites received by the examined user probably
originates in the lack of French-speaking websites for these partic-
ular search terms. It is not possible to further determine how the
choice was made whether and when a user in a foreign country
receives links to German websites.
It is a lucky coincidence that we received data from multiple data
donors, all with an IP address originating in Kaiserslautern, but
in dierent languages, namely English, Russian and German. is
allows us to eliminate the inuence of regionalization based on the
IP address.
18hps://twier.com/esekherif
19hps://www.transfermarkt.fr/cem-ozdemir/prol/spieler/170442
In the next step we examine the search results of a user receiv-
ing links to Russian websites from Google while searching from a
German IP address from Kaiserslautern.
7.2 Example 2: Google search from Germany
with partially Russian results
Our manual inspection showed a person located in Kaiserslautern
according to their IP address, who oen received Russian Wikipedia
pages while searching for politicians and political parties. Our
browser plug-in recorded the IP address as well as the keyboard
language used, which was set to Russian for this person. Table 12
shows a typical search result list for this user when searching for
”Angela Merkel”.
Table 12: Typical search result list for the search term ”An-
gela Merkel” for a user who donated around 40 result lists,
sometimes containing Russian results.
e second link of this result list refers to a Russian Wikipedia
page of Angela Merkel, the third link to the English version. e
fourth refers to the Facebook page of Angela Merkel, which is pre-
dominantly German content-wise. If someone were to open that
page while logged into Facebook and with his or her preferred
language set to Russian, the text supplied by Facebook would be in
Russian (e.g. the user display, etc.). us, this would not change the
content of the politician. Lastly a second English-speaking website
(forbes.com) appears near the end of the result list.
erefore the user did not receive any Russian websites, but Google
seems to regard the Russian Wikipedia pages as appropriate. It is
unclear why this is the case. We observed that for a lot of users
English keyboard seings do not necessarily imply English results,
which is why we do not think the Russian keyboard seings are
the (only) reason for these results. It is noteworthy that this person
was always logged into Google, which could be the source of the
information.
Aer that we compared the results received by the person from
Kaiserslautern, who received some Russian results, to other users
from Kaiserslautern and another user outside of Germany, namely
the person mentioned before from France (Figure 30).
It is noteworthy that users who received non-German results
from Google did not receive any top stories. e user from Kaiser-
slautern with a link to the Russian Wikipedia website of Sahra
Wagenknecht also received a link to her Twier prole. e last
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Figure 30: Search result lists for the search term ”Sahra Wa-
genknecht” on August 22, 2017 from users with IP addresses
in Paris (rightmost column) and Kaiserslautern. Identical
results are represented by the same color. e rst two
columns show users whose result lists are constantly Ger-
man. e third column shows the search results of a person
who sometimes receivedRussian results. e fourth column
shows the results of a user from Paris, France according to
their IP address.
part of this link ”lang=ru” only aects the content supplied by Twit-
ter (e.g. translations of the navigational buons like ”Messages”,
”Follow/ Unfollow”) – the tweets themselves are in German. e
user also receives links to an overview page from the Tagesspiegel
and an article from Bunte, both concerning Sahra Wagenknecht.
e user from France received an article about ”Sahra la Rouge”
and the English Wikipedia entry.
Interestingly the user from Kaiserslautern does not receive a Rus-
sian Wikipedia entry for every person that is present there: Except
for Dietmar Bartsch and Katrin Gu¨ring-Eckardt, every politician
included in our set of search terms is represented on the Russian
Wikipedia website, but not always displayed to the user.
Figure 31 shows the search results of 4 users for the search term
”Cem O¨zdemir” and for the same search time. e user from Kaiser-
slautern receives the German and English Wikipedia entry, the
French user gets the German and French entry. Apart from the
links that they share with the users receiving constantly German
Figure 31: Search result lists for the search term ”Cem
O¨zdemir” on August 22, 2017 from users with IP addresses
in Paris (rightmost column) and Kaiserslautern. Identical
results are represented by the same color. e rst two
columns show users whose result lists are constantly Ger-
man. e third column shows the search results of a person
who sometimes receivedRussian results. e fourth column
shows the results of a user from Paris, France according to
their IP address.
result lists, they also share the Twier prole of another person
with the name ”Cem O¨zdemir” who is not the German politician.
e same is true for their respective last entry, a link to a sub-page
of the top-level domain ”www.gruene.de” that is rarely seen else-
where. In summary both of the users who received non-German
results from Google share 6 links. e French user also received
two French websites along with the reference to the football player
and the correct Twier prole of Cem O¨zdemir. e result list of
the user from Kaiserslautern, who also received Russian results,
contained a news article from ”Zeit” which was not received by the
other three users. He or she shares 7 and 6 links respectively with
the other users from Kaiserslautern.
A lot more frequent than a person who receives Russian Wikipedia
websites are users with IP addresses in Germany and other coun-
tries, who receive mixed language results, consisting of English and
German websites. Among these is a user with an IP address from
Kaiserslautern. We therefore looked at four result lists of users with
an IP address based in Kaiserslautern for all political parties at the
same search time. Two of those users received only German results
(DE1 and DE2), the user with partially Russian results (RU) and a
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user with partially English websites originating in the USA (USA).
Figure 32 shows the number of common results for each party.
Figure 32: e result lists of four users with IP addresses
based in Kaiserslautern for all parties on September 5, 2017
were compared to nd the number of common links. Two
users only received German results (DE1 and DE2), one user
also received Russian and English websites (RU) and one
user websites withAmerican origin (USA). Displayed are the
number of identical links for each pair – the diagonal elds
(gray) show the total number of links contained in the per-
son’s search results.
It is noticeable that the two users with purely German results
almost always have identical search result lists. A manual inspec-
tion shows that even the order of the results is mostly identical.
Surprisingly, the remaining users have more links in common for
ve of the parties and the same amount of links in common for
two parties as the purely German users, even though they searched
from the same location based on IP addresses.
To further enhance this paern we did a last comparison to look at
all search result lists from Kaiserslautern and all result lists outside
of Germany based on IP locations for one search term and time
(September 22, 2017, ”Angela Merkel”). For every person except one
top stories were included, so we could determine whether Google
supplied them with English or German publication times (”1 hour
ago” vs. ”Vor 1 Stunde”); other languages were not represented in
this sample. e astonishing result is shown in Figure 33: e simi-
larity between the search results is highly dependent on whether
Google German-speaking or an English-speaking Person.
Even though the paerns in the deviant clusters remain com-
plex and also due to the relatively low number of users with con-
stantly German websites, a distinction between ”German” and ”non-
German” users is clearly visible. It is unclear which aspects factor
into Google’s decision whether a person is German-speaking and
should only receive German results. Users who also received Eng-
lish results showed very similar result lists, regardless of their
location (in this case Austria, Belgium, Great Britain and Denmark).
One exception to this is a person from Norway, who did not receive
any top stories – therefore it is unclear which language Google has
assigned to them. It is however noteworthy that this user received
two Norwegian websites and has received top stories for another
search term (”Alexander Gauland”) at the same search time, which
had Norwegian publication times. Another exception is one of the
Swiss users, who received a lot of results not present in the others’
result lists.
is results in a not completely isolated, but noticeably dierent
media space for the users receiving English (or other foreign) re-
sults while living in Germany (or at least using a router located
there).
7.3 Possible explanations
In the end the simplest explanation is probably the correct one: e
type of deviant search result lists for German IP locations can easily
be recreated by logging into one’s Google account and changing
the search language seings. To accomplish that, one must go to
the search seings on the Google website and change the language
seings to the desired language, e.g. French. Another visit to the
Google website shows that the navigational buons are now dis-
played in the selected language. If the term searched for results in
the display of top stories, these will be accompanied by the pub-
lications times in the selected language. Additionally the organic
results contain some deviant links identical to the one we found
when searching for the search terms used in this project: Links to
English Wikipedia pages, confusing CSU, CDU, AfD and SPD with
identical acronyms, more common in the selected language (e.g.
”Colorado State University”, ”Charles Darwin University”, ”Agence
Franc¸aise de De´veloppement”, ”symphysis pubis dysfunction”), and
also German websites that indeed belong to the German political
party or their respective social media proles. e similarities to
the deviant results found within our data set are strong – but this
does not necessarily proof that the search language seings are the
only factor resulting in these deviant result lists. We follow the
principle of ”Occam’s razor”, which states that the simplest solution
tends to be the right one. We therefore conclude that the deviant
result lists originate in the personal seings of the respective data
donor. e result is a combination of language lter, regionalization
(most likely depending on the IP location) and the most relevant
websites for the given search term.
It is important to note that the cases shown here did not contain
news about dierent political perspectives on the politicians or the
political parties. According to Eli Pariser’s dreaded content-specic
lter bubble, wherein some users receive a drastically dierent polit-
ical perspective than others could not be found in our manually in-
spected cases. English news came from e Guardian, French news
from Le Figaro, the Russian websites were Wikipedia or Wikimedia
pages. In a lot of cases the search results of a ”foreign” user diered
from specic aggregate topic pages, like hp://www.faz.net/aktuell/
politik/thema/martin-schulz compared to the result lists of more
regionalized ”German-speaking” users.
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Figure 33: Search result lists on September 22, 2017 at 4pm for the search term ”AngelaMerkel”. ey are sorted into result lists
from users with an IP address outside of Germany (6x Switzerland, 3x Austria, 2x Belgium, 2x USA, 2x France, 2x Great Britain,
Denmark, Norway) separated into columns. e last 6 columns contain users with an IP address based in Kaiserslautern. If
top stories were present, the publication time (”vor 4 Stunden”, ”1 hour ago”) indicated which language was assigned to the
user by Google. e deviant clusters were accompanied by English publication times, even with the user from Kaiserslautern.
e result lists in the cluster themselves are very similar to each other.
It still brings up the question what kind of information people
belonging to one of the minorities of a country, like the rst and
second generation of migrants, should receive and from which
source, so that these discussion forums overlap as far as possible.
8 SUMMARY
We come to the conclusion that, since almost all of the search result
lists show sucient overlap – regardless of content – the algorith-
mically based creation and reinforcement of isolated lter bubbles
is not present. It is noteworthy that even though users who received
foreign websites from Google (probably due to dierent search lan-
guage seings of these users) showed some overlap in their results,
their deviant clusters can be a sign of a lter bubble. ough this
is unavoidable due to the dierence in languages, this means that,
based on the four mechanisms that have to be working together
to create these dangerous lter bubbles, one must still inspect the
contents. Manual inspection and a number of received top-level
domains mostly display mainstream media, but there are also stray
top-level domains and URLs that are harder to classify. is would
require interdisciplinary analysis of the data and preferably further
research.
But what about the question whether the algorithm provides all
of us with one-sided content? Firstly the large amount of received
top-level domains contradicts this, but that does not answer the
question if there could have been other top-level domains that
should have been displayed, or if some top-level domains appeared
more or less frequently. What could be used to make such a com-
parison? One possible dimension would be to use the popularity of
the top-level domains according to all internet users, as is contin-
uously measured by the Nielsen-Online-Panel. e Nielsen-Panel
is based on a representative user group, whose internet behavior
is measured in great detail. For every top-level domain there is a
score called the ”active reach” based on the measurements of the
panel that shows the percentage of users that visited that top-level
domain at least once in a given time period20.
is leads to another chicken-and-egg problem, since Google
is denitely the most prominent search engine in Germany and a
great number of visits to a website are done via referral by Google.
is means that there is an unknown proportion of visits that only
occurred because of Google and hence the numbers do not repre-
sent a popularity measure independent of Google’s search engine
algorithm. erefore, the following ndings are more indicative
of further research questions than the results of the #Datenspende
project.
Figure 34 shows the application of the ”active reach” of a domain
against the URLs of the top stories (not the organic searches) of
this domain supplied by Google to the data donors in the same
period. Since the dierences per axis are very large (from 0.01 to
100% or from 1 to 1,000,000 URLs displayed), a double logarithmic
application was chosen. e paern of the data allows to create
a linear regression by this application. e formula y = 1,373 *
active reach0.9 essentially means that the number of URLs delivered
correlates almost linearly with the range, with a small damper for
longer ranges.
20is score is not very meaningful for extremely low scores, e.g. less than a hand full
of people visited this website. is will be noted in the Nielsen Report.
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Figure 34: e diagram shows the ”active reach” (percentage
of users that visited the top-level domain at least once) for
the dierent top-level domains according to the August edi-
tion of the Nielsen Report and the total number of search
results from August 2017 of our data set. It is a double loga-
rithmic application, where some sources with strong devia-
tion from the trend line have been marked.
In the Figure, some points are picked out which deviate from this
paern by a factor of approximately 5 upwards or downwards. is
means that they are delivered at least 5 times more or 5 times less
than expected according to the formula. On the one hand, this in-
cludes media that report on media such as correctiv.org, meedia.de
and uebermedien. Correctiv.org is a correction website that takes
up and corrects incorrect messages. While this top-level domain
in the Nielsen Panel has no reach in August, one of its URLs will
be delivered to 245 people in the data donation project, almost ve
times more than expected. Nevertheless, this is less remarkable
than rst thought, as it concerns exactly one top story, which is
delivered to all donors at this search time (August 24, 2017, 12pm,
search term ”Alexander Gauland”). Since we have already found
that the search result pages are very uniform overall, such a de-
cision always aects everyone at the time of the search. is is a
one-time event that suddenly raises the number of URLs delivered
above the expected value. Articles by meedia and uebermedien are
delivered 10 and 16 times more than expected. It is important to
emphasize once again that the comparison with the Nielsen reach is
methodologically dicult: neither does the ”active reach” represent
a popularity measure independent of Google’s search engine, nor
can popularity be regarded without restriction as a direct measure
of the content quality of the contributions of the top-level domains.
It may still be an interesting observation that the following 10
sources are the most overrepresented (regarding the expected value
from the regression):
(1) Epochtimes (with 240.004 links in all search result lists,
expected were 840)
(2) Chiemgau24.de (1.905 links, expected 22)
(3) Jungewelt.de (1.595 links, expected 81)
(4) Stimme.de (5.259 links, expected 274)
(5) Ka-news.de (4.047 links, expected 218)
(6) Tichyseinblick.de (4302 links, expected 235)
(7) Welt.de (131.793 links, expected 8120)
(8) U¨bermedien.de (2102 links, expected 131)
(9) Cicero.de (2785 links, expected 174)
(10) Butenunbinnen.de (2058 links, expected 131)
As with all relative scores, the most outliers are sources that did
not appear oen in the search results. e media with the highest
reach are however still represented within the top stories delivered
by Google. e combination of the websites of persons and politi-
cal parties, the Wikipedia entries and news websites, all found in
the organic search results, shows a broad view of politicians and
parties, which on the whole allows for comprehensive information
and opinion-forming. It should also be mentioned that further com-
bining the search terms used in this project would allow for a more
detailed search, in the case of an unsatisfactory rst search result
list.
8.1 Generalization of the results: possibilities
and boundaries
e results shown in this report can not be applied to all Google
users in Germany, since the data donors are not a representative
sample (caused by their own decision to participate). Interestingly,
the donors who seem to have used a dierent search language could
invalidate the argument that the set of users was so homogeneous
that this alone explains the low degree of personalization observed.
It appears improbable that all English-speaking users from dierent
countries are homogeneous in personalization, yet Figure 33 shows
remarkable similarities between their search result lists. Here too,
we follow the principle of Occam’s razor and assume that the search
result lists are mainly determined by search language seings, the
location (e.g. based on the IP address) and the general relevance
of the website, followed by previously visited websites to a lesser
extent and possibly some personalized links. erefore it would
surprise us if further studies show highly deviant degrees of per-
sonalization.
In every case, our observations are only valid for the time period
and search terms used in this project. We can not preclude the
possibility of the degree of personalization changing over time, but
this study shows how this can be monitored simply, cost-eciently,
exibly (regarding the search terms) and automatically. is holds
true for every search engine.
8.2 Demand for suitable interfaces to examine
the lter bubble theory in social networks
and other intermediaries
is does not apply to social networks like Facebook, other social
media like Twier, Instagram or YouTube. At the moment it would
only be possible with great eort to lter out and centrally collect
all of a user’s political content in the news feed of a Facebook
account, for example. ProPublica has tried such a project during
the federal election of 2017. An API that allows for selective access
to these contents does not exist, so the only choice would be to
require the users to allow complete access (privacy concerns) or to
ask them to submit screenshots of political content. e laer is
neither easy, nor can the data be analyzed automatically, since the
content would have to be described manually to allow for searching
and summarizing the data.
Hence a demand for the necessary interfaces arises, to investigate all
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social media and social networks, whose degree of personalization
could lead to algorithmic creation or reinforcement of lter bubbles.
A suitable control of the degree of personalization relieves the
respective companies – as long as the degree remains low – of the
demands of the society to gain further insight into their soware
code. If a high degree of personalization (of relevant content) and
a certain degree of isolation of the lter bubbles becomes evident,
further investigations are required to determine to what extent
the content has extremely dierent perspectives and makes social
discourse more dicult. Such a staggered model of the depth of
insight through black box analysis depending on the measured
degree of personalization would thus help both sides.
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10 APPENDIX
A) Category System
e category system is used to assign domains that were displayed
as part of the data donation. It was developed by the Bayerische
Landeszentrale fu¨r neue Medien (BLM) who also carried it out.
10.1 Main categories
Every domain is assigned to one of the main categories. In cases of
conict the most concise assignment is chosen.
a Owned Content: e category Owned Content contains
all channels that allow the parties an unltered display of
opinion, either through a personal website of a member of
the party, a local branch, or the party itself. Social media
channels also belong to this category, but will be assigned
to their own category in this categorization scheme.
b Social Media: Social Media describes all channels that
focus on the social interactions between provider and users.
e domains allow for networking, i.e. to exchange ideas
with each other and to create and relay media content
for individuals, specic groups, or the public. Examples
for networks that belong to this category are Facebook,
Twier or Instagram.
c Wikipedia: All Wikipedia domains are assigned to this
category.
d Media: Domains that are operated by a media provider are
assigned to this category. A website is considered a media
provider if it provides journalistic content and acts as the
online oshoot of classic print media, a private television
or radio provider, or a public-service broadcaster. Foreign
journalistic content as well as online-only providers also
belong to this category (see sub-categories). Examples are:
www.schwarzwaelder-bote.de, news.sky.com, www.news.de.
e Freemail portals: Freemail portals oer free email ad-
dresses and a mailbox to send and receive emails. Most
of these websites also contain news columns. e most
common Freemail portals belonging to this category are
web.de, yahoo.com and gmx.net. Freemail domains that
appear in the results of Google News will not be assigned
to any sub-categories, only the main category.
f Publicly funded: e category ”publicly funded” con-
tains all domains nanced by public funds, e.g. the Federal
Agency for Civic Education (Bundeszentrale fu¨r politis-
che Bildung (bpb)) and the online presence of cities and
municipalities.
g Other: Every domain that does not explicitly belong to
any of the before-mentioned categories will the assigned
to the this category.
10.2 Sub-categories
Sub-categories contain domains that were previously assigned to
the ”Media” category. e other main categories are not specialized
any further. Every domain can only be assigned to one sub-category.
a Print: e category contains all online oerings from clas-
sic German print media (newspapers and magazines). Do-
mains are included if they originate in Germany and pub-
lish German content. Example include: spiegel.de, faz.net,
welt.de.
b TV: All online oerings of approved German private tele-
vision providers are assigned to this category. Both origin
and published language of the content is German. Example
include: rtl.de, pro-sieben.de
c Public service providers (O¨RR): is category contains
all online oerings of German public-service broadcasters,
like their online branches for radio and television channels.
is category can contain daserste.de, ndr.de, zdf.de.
d Online Only: Media oerings who publish their content
exclusively on the internet are assigned to this category.
Examples include: 02elf.net, www.promiash.de.
